Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City School District : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Murray City v. Board of Education of Murray City
School District : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard C. Howe; Attorney for Appellant;
Dansie, Ellett & Hammill; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Murray City v. Board of Education, No. 10060 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4489
UNIVERSITY OF UTl 
OCT 1 --1 1964 
L.A W Lf3KARY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF ',l}Tr L E o 
MURRAY CITY, A Municipal - ~?R2 8 l96A 
Corporation of the State . . •.... ··.;··;···-
of Utah, _ ~ ~- ---~-~: ___ . c ... u:-;. t.;~ • .~ 
PllLintiff-Responden~\ur · Su?"J"'~ 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, a 
Municipal Corporation of the 





Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
5055 South State ~t. 
Murray, Utah : 
Atto1·ney fnJ' Ap1}eZDNitMSHY OF U1Ar-, 
D.-\XSIE. ELLETT & HAMMILt 
5085 South State St. ~ APR 2 g 1965 
Murray, Utah L 
Attorne-ys j01· Plaintiff-Resporufnt LAW LIIRAit): 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIN'D OF CASE ---------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------- 1 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT I. THE SEWER SERVI,CE CHARGES IM-
POSED BY THE PLAINTI1FF ARE "TAXES" 
OR "LOCAL ASSESSMENTS", WHIICH THE 
DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT IS EX-
EMPT FROM PAYING UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
AUTHORITIE1S 
CASES: 
In re Petition of City of Philadelphia, ·340 1Pa. 17 16 
A. 2d 32 -------------------------------------------------------------~------ 11 
Loubwille v. Barker, 307 Ky. 655, 21'2 S. W. ·2d 122 
( 1948) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 
Opinion of the Justices, 93 N.H. 478, 39 A. 2d 76'5, 
( 19-!4) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
State ex. rei. Board of Education v. McGonagle, 38 
Utah 277, 112 Pac. 401 ____________________________ 5, 7, 8, 12, 14 
State v. Salt Lake City Public Board of Education 
13 Ut. 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 ___________________________________ : 13 
Utah Constitutional Provisions : 
Article 13, Section 2 ------------------------------------------ 4 
Statutes: 
U.C.A. 1953, Section 53-4-12 ----------------------------------5, 6 
U.C.A. 1953, Section 59..:2-1 ------------------------------------ 4 
:\Iiscellaneous: 
Page and Jones, "Taxation By Assessment", Sec. 6 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY CITY, A Municipal 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, a 
Municipal Corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
DefendJant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10060 
ST~TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover delinquent sewer 
serYice charges. The defendant counterclaimed seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from 
the payment of the charges. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR·T 
The case was tried to the court. From a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law that it 
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is exempt by law from the payment of sewer service 
charges. 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
In this case appellant and respondent in the 
lower court stipulated to the following agreed State-
ment of Facts: 
'~The plaintiff is a municipal corporation and 
'a second class city owning and operating a sewer 
system within its corporate limits. Defendant is a 
body corpor!ate with its boundaries coinciding with 
those of the plain tiff. Prior to September, 19'52, the 
plaintiff's sewer system served only approximately 
one-third of the city'·s homes and businesses. Plain-
tiff had no treatment plant, but treated the sewage 
in city owned septic tanks. On September 5, 1962, 
the electors of the city a:t 'a special election author-
ized the issu:ance of $1,300,000 of water and sewer 
revenue bonds to provide for the construction of ex-
tensions and improvements to the city's water plant 
and sewer system. The sewer system was thereafter 
greatly expanded to serve most of the city's dwel-
Tings and commercial buildings, and a sewage treat-
ment plant was constructed to treat sewage col-
lected from the entire system. 
After the system was extended, persons mak-
ing connections thereto were charged a connection 
fee in accordance with a schedule adopted by city 
ordinance (See Section 3 of Ordinance 56 as amend-
ed for the connection fees being currently charged)· 
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(R. 6) Persons who were alr~ady connected to the 
system paid no such fee, 'but new and old connectors 
alike were and are presently required 'to pay a 
monthly service charge, the current rates be'ing 
shown in Section 2 of Ordinance 56 as ·amended. 
(R. 6) Defendant now has 10 school buildings and 
one administrative building connected to the plain-
tiff's sewer system. The defendant paid 'the monthly 
service charge of five cents per child until the At-
torney General of Utah 'in an opinion issued on or 
about November 8, 1960, ruled that the Sta:te of 
Utah was not ·obligated to pay fees for connecting 
a State owned building to a municipal sewer system. 
Upon the authority of that opinion the defendant 
refused to pay for the service charges and connec-
tion fees, ·and the plaintiff brought suit to recover 
all delinquent chlarges. 
The service charges and connection fees col-
lected by the plaintiff are placed in a 'separate fund 
and used for the payment of operation and main-
tenance costs and the payment of principal and in-
terest falling due on the revenue bonds issued to 
finance construction of the extension to the system 
in 1952. The balance remaining after the payment 
of those costs ha:s 'been used in recent years to help 
finance capital improvements to the system, includ-
ing expansion of the capacity of the treatment plant. 
However, in some former years the balance in the 
fund at the end of the year was transferred to the 
general fund of the city. 
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A copy of the plaintiff's ordinance (#50) 
authorizing issuance of revenue bonds to defray the 
costs of extending the city's sewer and water sys-
tem is made part of this statement of facts. Also, 
the pleadings of the parties hereto are incorporated 
herein and made part of this statement of facts." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SEWER SERVICE CHARGES I1MPOSED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF ARE "TAXES" OR "LOCA'L ASSESS-
MEN'TS", WHICH THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT IS EXEMPT FROM 1PAYING UNDER THE CON-
STITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Art. XIII, Sec. ·2 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in part : 
"* * * The property of the state, counties, 
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corp-
orations and public libraries, lots with the 
buildings thereon used exclusively for either 
religious worship or charitable purposes, and 
places of burial not held or used for private or 
corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxa-
tion. * * *" (Italics added) 
Implementing the :above Constitutional provi-
sion, the Legi'slature has provided in Sec. 59-2-1, 
U.C.A. 1953 as follows: 
"The property of the United States, of ~his 
state, counties, cities, towns, school distn~ts, 
municipal corporations an.d public librar.Ies, 
lots with the buildings thereon used exclusive-
ly for either religious worship or charitable 
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purposes, a~d places of burial not _held or 
used for private or corporate benefit, shall 
be exempt from taxation. * * *" (Italics 
added) 
Again, in Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, the Legis-
lature reiterated that school districts are exempt 
from taxation of any nature: 
"All property real and personal held by 1any 
board of education shall be exempt from gen-
eral and special taxation, and from all local 
assessments for any purpose, 'and no such 
property shall be taken in any manner for 
debt." 
The sewer service charges imposed by the pl'ain-
tiff city against the defendant board of education 
are "taxes" or "local 1assessments" within the mean-
ing of the above statutory and constitutional pro-
dsions. So held this court in 1910 in the case of State 
c.r 1·el. Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Mc-
Gonagle, 38 Utah 277, 11~2 Pac. 401. In that case 
Salt Lake City extended 'and constructed a public 
sewer along one of its public streets. In order to de-
fray the abutters' portion of the costs and expenses 
thereof, it levied an assessment or tax on the lands 
abutting the street along which the sewer was con-
structed. The Board of Education of Salt Lake City 
owned land abutting that street which was used for 
school purposes, and upon which a school building 
was maintained by it. The City levied a tax or 
assessment against the land of the Board amounting 
to S98.00. An ordinance of Salt :Uake City provided 
that whenever property had been previously assessed 
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for a sewer or a sewer extension, and any portion 
of such assessment remained due and delinquent 
a:t the time of an application for a permit for a con-
nection, no permit should be issued until such de-
linquent assessment was paid. 
The Board made application 'to the City En-
gineer for a sewer connection to its property, and 
m!ade payment of all the required fees. The Engin-
eer, however, refused to issue the Board a permit 
to connect because it had not paid the special assess-
ment levied against the school property sought to 
be connected with the sewer system. 
This court issued a writ of mandamus requir-
ing the Engineer to grant the permit for the con-
nection, and held that under Section 1933 Comp. 
IJaws 1907 (Now Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, 'set 
out 'above) the assessment made by the City against 
the Board's property was void. 
In that case the City further contended that 
even though the assessment was void, it could law-
fully make a reasonable charge for the connection 
to its sewer by the Board. This Court rejected that 
argument stating: 
"It, however, i's urged, that though the pro-
perty was exempt and the assessment invalid 
still, the city being the owner of the sewer, 
could lawfully impose the payment of areas-
on!able charge before it was required to per-
mit the board to connect with or use the sewer, 
and that the payment of ninety-eight dollars, 
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the amount of the assessment, by the board 
for the use of the sewer was a reasonable 
charge. The legislature has seen fit to exempt 
~11 property of the board, 'both real and per-
sonal, from special taxation and all ·local as-
sessments, for any purpose. Since the proper-
ty was not subject to the assessment, and the 
levy for that reason invalid land the assess-
ment unenforceable, to then permit the muni-
cipality to impose as a condi'tion of tapping 
and making a connection with the public 
sewer the payment of 1a charge for the use of 
the sewer, is to allow the municipality to do 
indirectly what it cannot do directly. ( Bta te 
ev rei. Dunner v. Graydon, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 
634; Meyler v. Meadville, 2'3 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 
119.)" 
In the case now before the court, it is true, no 
special assessment was made by ·Murray City !against 
the property of the defendant School Board. The 
sewers were financed instead by revenue bonds 
which are paid by the conn~tion fees and monthly 
sewer service charges paid by users of the system. 
However, under holding of the McGonagle case, 
:\Iurray City should not be allowed by the use of 
service charges to do indirectly that which they 
could not do directly by the use of a local assessment 
against the School Board's property. This court 
wisely struck down in the McGonagle case all at-
tempts to eX!act connection fees from the 'School 
Board regardless of the form or name of the "charge" 
- whether called a "tax" by the city or whether 
called a "reasonable charge" for the use of the sys-
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tern. 'This court looked beyond the form to the sub-
stance. It should do so again in the ins·tant case, 
and strike 'down the attempt of Murray City to 
exact "charges" which are tantamount to '~taxes" 
or '''local'assessments''. 
While the McGonagle case i·s conclusive author-
ity for the exemption of the defendant School Board 
from the payment of sewer service charges imposed 
by the plaintiff City, it is helpful and interesting 
to examine cases from other jurisdictions where 
this question ha's ari'sen. In the Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 93 N. H. 478, 39 A. 2d 7'6'5, (1944) the Court 
advised the Governor of New H·ampshire that it 
would be permissable and Lawful for the State to 
pay the City of Concord service charges.,for the use 
of a City owned sewer serving the State House and 
other ·state-owned buildings. However, this advice 
was given by the court only because ( 1) connection 
to the sewer system was optional with the State 
and ('2) because the chlarges collected could only be 
used for the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of the system, and could not be used for the 
payment of the general expense'S of the City. (As 
will be later noted, both these elements are lacking 
in the case now before this court). 
The New Hampshire court quoted with approv-
al :and placed strong reliance on the following ex-
cerpt from Sec. 6 of Page & Jones', "TAXATION 
BY ASSESSMENT": 
"A number of cases exist which present facts 
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very much like those of a regular local assess-
ment, but which differ from the l~ocal assess-
ment in one essential fact. This essential dif-
ference is that in these case's it is optional 
with the party so charged to incur the liability 
by acceptance of the benefit for which the 
charge is made, or to ·abstain from such bene-
fit and thus be free from liability. Common 
examples of this 'are ordinances providing for 
furnishing water to part or 'all of the City 
to those who wish to take it, at 1a price fixed 
by ordinance, where the persons who make use 
of the water are charged an amount, some-
times estimated a:t a lump sum, and some-
times based upon the amount consumed. 
Whichever form the charge mlay assume, the 
person who makes use of such commodity i's 
under no legal obligation to do so, and does 
so voluntarily. Such a statute does not impose 
an assessment in the proper ·sen'se of the term, 
though the charge is often spoken of as a 
"tax". The transaction relai'ly amounts to an 
offer by the municipal corporation and an 
acceptance by the party who takes the water, 
thus forming a con tract. The transaction then 
is substantially a contract sale. 
* * * Another form of a charge which is in 
substance a contract is to be found where a 
municipality, under authority conferred by 
statute, imposes a charge upon property own-
ers who connect their land with a sewer sys-
tem constructed by the city, the owner being 
free to avoid liability by refraining from 
making such connection. Such charges may 
be a fixed sum for the privilege of such con-
nection, or it may be a charge based upon 
the amount of sewerage discharged from the 
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premises into the sewer. Such a ch1arge is not 
ordinarily regarded as a loc'al assessmen't". 
(Italics added) 
The necessary implication in the Opinion of the 
Justices was that if the State were compelled to 
connect its building to the City sewer system, or 
if the charges could find the'ir way into the general 
funds of 'the City, the charges would then be re-
garded as loeal assessments which the State was 
exempt from paying. 
In the case before the court, the balance re-
maining at the end of the year in the fund in which 
connection fees and service charges 'are placed can 
be and has been transferred to the general fund of 
the Crty. (R. 5) Under Sec. 11 of Ordinance #50 
(page 10 of Ordinance attached ·to Stipulation of 
Facts) all owners of improved property within two 
hundred ( 200) feet of the 'sewer line are compelled 
to connect and pay the connection fee and monthly 
service charges. Thus the 'two elements relied upon 
by the New Hampshire court in gr!anting permis-
siun for payment of service charges are clearly lack-
ing iri the case before the court. 
It should 'be noted that under Ordinance #56 
of Murray City ( R. 6) sewer service charges are 
imposed when there are structures which can be 
served by the sewer, irrespective of whether the 
structures are actUJally connected to the sewer. "Ser-
vice charges" imposed under those circumstances 
are in reality "taxes", held the Supreme Court of 
10 
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Pennsylvania in the case of In re Petition of City 
of Philadelphia, 340 Pa. 17, 16 A. 2d 32. There the 
court considered annual sewer rents or charges im-
posed by the City of Philadelphia against owners of 
property abutting a sewer line irrespective of 
whether the property was connected 'to the system. 
The court pointed out that when connection to a 
se\ver system is voluntarily made by one seeking 
service, the connector by using the facility 'impliedly 
contracts and a:grees to pay the rates, and that his 
obligation to m:ake payment rests upon contra~t 
rather than upon any exercise of the taxing power. 
But, said the court: 
"There i·s, however, a clear distinction to be 
drawn between rents paid for ·actual use of 
municipally owned utility facilities and charg-
es such ~as the city here seeks to impose. * * *" 
"* * * it is manifest that the charges here in 
questi'on cannot be sll'stained on the theory 
by which sewer and water rentals have here-
tofore been upheld by this court ·and the Su-
perior Court in cases already referred to ; 
the burden of this charge being imposed in 
invitum, (·against one not !assenting) no im-
plied assent to its payment can possibly he 
deduced." 
"* * * Being imposed without any regard 
\vhatever to the extent or value of the use 
made of the sewer facility or whether any 
use is made, the charge provided for by the 
ordinance is, in legal effect, undoubtedly :a 
tax, and the obligation to pay it could 'be 
created only by the City's exercise of its gen-
11 
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eral taxing powers.'' (Citing cases) (Italics 
added) 
'Thus it is manifest that Murray City's Ordin-
ance #'56 requiring payment of service charges by 
non-connectors as well as by connectors cannot be up-
held on any theory other th'an that the charges are 
'~taxes" or "local assessments" within the meaning 
of Art. XIII, Sec. 2 of our Constitution, and Sec-
tions 59-2-1 'and 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953. 'The wisdom 
of this court in the McGonagle case in striking down 
all attempts to exact charges regardless of the n1ame 
affixed to them is substantiated by the New Hamp-
shire and Pennsylvania cases above discussed. 
The operation of :a sewer system by a munici-
pal'i'ty is 1a governmental function. Louisville v. 
Barker, 307 Ky. 655, 212 S.W. 2d 122 (1948). If 
Murray City is here allowed to impose and collect 
a '''service ch'arge" from the Board of Education, 
what is to prevent it from imposing and collecting 
"service chlarges" for other governmental functions 
such as garbage collecting, fire fighting, etc. The 
end result could well be that the Board of Education 
would wind up paying "service charges" for many 
governmental functions. This was the very evil con-
demned by this court in the McGonagle case, i.e. a 
city imposing a "service charge" where it could not 
impose a "tax". 
It should be stressed in this case that the boun-
daries of the defendant School District are exactly 
the same as those of the plaintiff City. 'The same 
12 
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taxpayers support the School District and the City. 
No taxpayer will suffer any detriment if the School 
District is exempted from payment of the service 
charges. The exemption will save the School Dis-
trict from having to pay annually several thousand 
dollars which may find their way, in part, to the 
general coffers of the City. 
This court in the case of State v. Salt Lake City 
Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 
2d 468, held that the State Road Commission could 
not take by condemn!ation the land of the Salt Lake 
City School District without compensating it. 'The 
court there noted that the taxpayers of the two 
governmental agencies involved were n:ot identical 
and implied that if there had been this identity, 
the decision of the court might have 'been different. 
Regardless of that fact, however, it would seem 
that if one state agency cannot condemn the prop-
erty of another state agency without paying com-
pensation, it neither should be allowed to impose 
burdens and charges against it, irrespective of 
wb(!ther the burdens and charges are denominated 
"taxes" or "service charges". 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court that the defend-
ant School District must pay service charges for 
the use of the plaintiff's sewer will have far reach-
ing effect if not reversed by this court. If permitted 
to stand, it will require the State of Utah to pay 
13 
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service charges and connection fees on 1all of its 
state owned buildings in Salt Lake City and through-
out the State, as well as requiring all counties, school 
districts, and dther political subdivisions to pay. 
This court in the McGonagle case foresaw this prob-
lem and wisely struck down all attempts to collect 
service charges. Any other result would have em-
ascula:ted our constitutional and statutory provi-
sions exempting the State and its subdivisions from 
the payment of "'tJaxes" and Hlocal assessments" of 
any na:ture. The exemption granted to school dis-
1tricts in Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, is broad in that 
it encompasses '~taxes" and "local assessments" of 
any nature. This court should not narrow the defi-
nition of "local assessments". 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
5055 South State St. 
Murray, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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